habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
CVE-2025-38722 · published 4 Sept 2025
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 7.8 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2025-38722?
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Who is affected
- Linux Linux: db1a8dd916aac986871f6b873a3aefad906f383a to < d26058c2349d77d1ef179a2cc9752ca12004b6ff, db1a8dd916aac986871f6b873a3aefad906f383a to < c07886761fd6251db6938d4e747002e3d150d231, db1a8dd916aac986871f6b873a3aefad906f383a to < 40deceb38f9db759772d1c289c28fd2a543f57fc, db1a8dd916aac986871f6b873a3aefad906f383a to < 55c232d7e0241f1d5120b595e7a9de24c75ed3d8
- Linux Linux: 5.16
How to check
- Find out whether you run the affected product and which version, then compare it with the versions above.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex that asks it to check whether you run this product.
- Apply the vendor's update or mitigation from the references below. If there is none yet, limit exposure of the affected service until there is.
- If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.
dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to
another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours;
that "will be" is actually "might have already been".
Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install()
only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer
have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to
underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet;
unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.
Check your whole app
Dependencies are only half of it. Free and read-only: before you push, run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder, no account needed. For your live app, you prove it's yours with a one-line tag first.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d26058c2349d77d1ef179a2cc9752ca12004b6ff
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c07886761fd6251db6938d4e747002e3d150d231
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/40deceb38f9db759772d1c289c28fd2a543f57fc
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/55c232d7e0241f1d5120b595e7a9de24c75ed3d8
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/33927f3d0ecdcff06326d6e4edb6166aed42811c
Merged from CVE List. Last updated 25 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON