Pillow: TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips
CVE-2026-112897 · GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg · published 20 Oct 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 8.7 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-112897?
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Who is affected
Pillow(PyPI) >= 5.3.0, < 13.0.0
How to check
- Run
pip show Pillowin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
- Or run
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How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex: it checks your lockfiles for this and upgrades it.
- Upgrade
Pillowto 13.0.0 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
```
============================================================================
TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips
Location: src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:554 in _decodeStrip()
Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```
Pillow hands back leftover process memory as image pixels when it opens a small crafted TIFF file. Anyone who can get an application to open their image, and can see something produced from its pixels (a thumbnail, a preview, a converted copy), can read heap memory that the process had previously used and freed. This works in the default configuration: opening and loading the 478-byte file succeeds with no error or warning, and every row below the first eight holds stale memory instead of picture content.
The bug is in `_decodeStrip()` in `src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c`, and `_decodeTile()` has the same shape. The function `realloc()`s `state->buffer` to `TIFFStripSize()` bytes without initialising it and calls `TIFFReadEncodedStrip()`. Whenever that call does not return -1, it copies all `RowsPerStrip` rows of the buffer into the image. libtiff's JPEG codec only warns when the JPEG embedded in a strip has fewer rows than the strip, and Pillow silences libtiff warnings. The codec decodes the rows that exist and still returns the full strip size, so the untouched remainder is copied out as pixels. libtiff's Group 4 fax codec behaves the same way for a stream that ends early.
The attached reproducer builds a 256×256 TIFF whose single strip or tile is a 256×8 JPEG. Before loading it, the script frees buffers filled with `b"LEAK"`. It then finds 15,872 copies of `LEAK` in rows 8–255 of the decoded image (the same freed chunk was reused in 500 of 500 runs). Under glibc's `MALLOC_PERTURB_`, those rows are entirely the allocator's fill byte. A well-formed control file decodes correctly in both cases.
This is a read of uninitialised heap memory, not memory corruption. Each strip can disclose up to width × `RowsPerStrip` bytes, and what comes back depends on the allocator's state at the time. The strip path was introduced in e91b851fdc1c ("Add reading old-JPEG compressed TIFFs", first released in Pillow 6.0.0). The tile path has had the same pattern since f0436a4ddc95 (Pillow 5.3.0).
## Details
`src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c` decodes compressed TIFFs through libtiff into a strip
(or tile) buffer that it `realloc()`s to `TIFFStripSize()` bytes and never initialises, and
then copies all `RowsPerStrip` rows of that buffer into the image whenever
`TIFFReadEncodedStrip()` does not return -1. libtiff's JPEG codec does not fail when the
JPEG stream inside a strip has fewer rows than the strip: it decodes the rows that exist
and returns the full strip size. The rows it did not write are whatever the heap held
before, and Pillow returns them as pixels.
A 478-byte file shows it: a classic little-endian TIFF, 256×256, `BitsPerSample=8`,
`Compression=7`, `PhotometricInterpretation=1`, `RowsPerStrip=256`, one strip whose data
is a baseline JPEG of 256×**8** pixels (as written by `Image.new("L",(256,8),200).save(…,"JPEG")`).
`Image.open(BytesIO(data)).load()` succeeds with default settings (compressed TIFFs always
take the libtiff path). Rows 0–7 of the result are the JPEG content (value 200); the
remaining 63488 bytes of `im.tobytes()` are heap garbage: run under glibc's
`MALLOC_PERTURB_=1` they are all `0xFE`, under `MALLOC_PERTURB_=170` all `0x55` (the
fresh-`malloc` fill byte), and in a process that has just freed buffers containing
`b"LEAK"` they contain 15872 copies of `LEAK`.
Feeding the same file to libtiff 4.5.0 directly confirms the library side:
`TIFFReadEncodedStrip(t, 0, buf, 65536)` prints
`JPEGPreDecode: Warning, Improper JPEG strip/tile size, expected 256x256, got 256x8.`,
returns 65536, and leaves 63488 of the 65536 buffer bytes untouched. Pillow installs
`TIFFSetWarningHandler(NULL)` (`TiffDecode.c:682`), so the warning is not visible either.
The strip path:
```c
// src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:552
/* realloc to fit whole strip */
/* malloc check above */
new_data = realloc(state->buffer, state->bytes); // state->bytes = TIFFStripSize()
…
state->buffer = new_data;
for (; state->y < state->ysize; state->y += rows_per_strip) {
…
if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(
tiff,
TIFFComputeStrip(tiff, state->y, plane),
(tdata_t)state->buffer,
strip_size
) == -1) {
… return -1;
}
…
// iterate over each row in the strip and stuff data into image
for (strip_row = 0;
strip_row < MIN((INT32)rows_per_strip, state->ysize - state->y);
strip_row++) {
…
shuffler(
(UINT8 *)im->image[state->y + state->yoff + strip_row] +
state->xoff * im->pixelsize,
state->buffer + strip_row * row_byte_size,
state->xsize
);
```
`state->buffer` arrives here as the one-row `calloc` made by `decode.c:230`
(`(bits*xsize+7)/8` = 256 bytes for the example). The `realloc` to 65536 bytes hands back
a different, uninitialised chunk; nothing zeroes it. `TIFFReadEncodedStrip()` returns the
nominal strip size on success, not the number of rows produced, and the only check is
`== -1`, so the row loop unconditionally copies 256 rows × 256 bytes into `im->image`
(which itself is zeroed by `core.new`, so the garbage provably comes from `state->buffer`).
`_decodeTile()` has the same shape (`TiffDecode.c:448` `realloc` to `TIFFTileSize()`, then
`tile_length` rows copied after each `TIFFReadTile()` at 460–488).
For a well-formed file the JPEG inside the strip is 256×256, libtiff fills all 65536 bytes
and the copy is correct. The malicious file d…
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References
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112897
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/1d4773e6cea0c4a2814e6d4cdc099bbcf56da6ce
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 24 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON