high · 8.8 Patched

nbconvert: Arbitrary file write through path traversal in cell output filenames when exporting to md, latex, rst and asciidoc

CVE-2026-114140 · GHSA-pjvx-prjx-h659 · published 22 Oct 2026

How serious is it

  • Severity: high, CVSS score 8.8 out of 10.
  • No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
  • Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
  • No public exploit in Exploit-DB.

Is your app affected by CVE-2026-114140?

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Who is affected

  • nbconvert (PyPI) >= 5.4.0, <= 7.17.1

How to check

  1. Run pip show nbconvert in your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages.
  2. Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
  3. Or run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder. It reads your lockfile and flags this vulnerability along with every other known one.

How to fix

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  1. Upgrade nbconvert to 7.17.2 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy.
  2. If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.

The advisory

### Summary nbconvert <= v7.17.1 has an arbitrary file write vulnerability due to a path traversal in ipynb cell output metadata, more specifically on the filename attribute. Vulnerable converters : `--to markdown`, `--to latex`, `--to rst`, `--to asciidoc`. In `ExtractOutputPreprocessor`, `extractoutput.py:116-119` joins attacker-controlled `path` to `output_files_dir` with no canonicalization check, enabling arbitrary file write. This is a sibling vulnerability of https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4c99-qj7h-p3vg. ### Impact If a victim runs nbconvert on a malicious ipynb file, it can create some files with arbitrary data in arbitrary locations, i.e. override authorized_keys. Note that running the cell with jupyter overrides the output, so it would "clean up" malicious cells. ### PoC In a ipynb file: ```json "cells": [{ "cell_type": "code", "id": "abc123", "execution_count": 1, "metadata": {}, "source": "# PoC", "outputs": [{ "output_type": "display_data", "metadata": { "filename": "../../../tmp/PWNED.png" # ← traverses outside output_dir }, "data": { # minimal valid PNG (1×1 pixel) "image/png": "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" } }] }] ``` ### Patches Fixed in - https://github.com/jupyter/nbconvert/commit/ce4bd99aec31d81d759fa8eeb8643179392ec66f - [7.17.2](https://github.com/jupyter/nbconvert/releases/tag/v7.17.2)

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References

Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 25 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON