Vue I18n: escapeParameter does not prevent XSS through srcdoc in translation messages
CVE-2026-118257 · GHSA-83rm-6c8r-g728 · published 28 Oct 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 7.2 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-118257?
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Cursor or any AI coding tool: it runs a free Shippable scan of your project and fixes what it finds. Built with Lovable, Bolt or v0? Scan your live app. Or upload your package file.
Who is affected
vue-i18n(npm) = 9.14.5vue-i18n(npm) = 10.0.8vue-i18n(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14vue-i18n(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4petite-vue-i18n(npm) = 9.14.5petite-vue-i18n(npm) = 10.0.8petite-vue-i18n(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14petite-vue-i18n(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4@intlify/core-base(npm) = 9.14.5@intlify/core-base(npm) = 10.0.8@intlify/core-base(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14@intlify/core-base(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4@intlify/core(npm) = 9.14.5@intlify/core(npm) = 10.0.8@intlify/core(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14@intlify/core(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4@intlify/vue-i18n-core(npm) = 9.14.5@intlify/vue-i18n-core(npm) = 10.0.8@intlify/vue-i18n-core(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14@intlify/vue-i18n-core(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4@intlify/shared(npm) = 9.14.5@intlify/shared(npm) = 10.0.8@intlify/shared(npm) >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14@intlify/shared(npm) = 12.0.0-alpha.4
How to check
- Run
npm ls vue-i18nin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Run
npm ls petite-vue-i18nin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Run
npm ls @intlify/core-basein your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Run
npm ls @intlify/corein your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Run
npm ls @intlify/vue-i18n-corein your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Run
npm ls @intlify/sharedin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
- Or run
npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000in your project folder. It reads your lockfile and flags this vulnerability along with every other known one.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex: it checks your lockfiles for this and upgrades it.
- No fixed version of
vue-i18nyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
vue-i18nyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
vue-i18nto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
vue-i18nto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - No fixed version of
petite-vue-i18nyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
petite-vue-i18nyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
petite-vue-i18nto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
petite-vue-i18nto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - No fixed version of
@intlify/core-baseyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
@intlify/core-baseyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
@intlify/core-baseto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
@intlify/core-baseto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - No fixed version of
@intlify/coreyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
@intlify/coreyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
@intlify/coreto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
@intlify/coreto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - No fixed version of
@intlify/vue-i18n-coreyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
@intlify/vue-i18n-coreyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
@intlify/vue-i18n-coreto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
@intlify/vue-i18n-coreto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - No fixed version of
@intlify/sharedyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - No fixed version of
@intlify/sharedyet. Replace or remove it, or apply the workaround in the advisory below. - On >= 11.1.10, < 11.4.14: Upgrade
@intlify/sharedto 11.4.14 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - On = 12.0.0-alpha.4: Upgrade
@intlify/sharedto 12.0.0-alpha.5 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
### Summary
When `escapeParameter` is enabled (`escapeParameterHtml` in the Legacy API), Vue I18n passes the translated string through `sanitizeTranslatedHtml()`. The sanitizer escapes `<` and `>` in attribute values and neutralizes event handler attributes such as `onerror`, but it does not handle the `srcdoc` attribute of `<iframe>`.
The value of `srcdoc` is an HTML document: the browser decodes the character references in it and parses the result as a nested document in the same origin. The escaping and the neutralization done by the sanitizer are both character references, so they are undone inside `srcdoc`. This bypasses the fix for CVE-2025-53892 (GHSA-x8qp-wqqm-57ph).
### Details
`sanitizeTranslatedHtml()` ([`packages/shared/src/sanitize.ts` in v11.4.13](https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/v11.4.13/packages/shared/src/sanitize.ts#L126-L162)) works on the final translated string:
1. It escapes `<`, `>`, `"` and `'` inside quoted attribute values.
2. It rewrites the `on` of event handler attributes to `on`.
3. It replaces `javascript:` URLs in `href`, `src`, `action` and `formaction` with `about:blank`.
Inside `srcdoc`, steps 1 and 2 only produce character references, which the browser decodes before parsing the value as a document. Markup inside `srcdoc` therefore survives the sanitizer, with escaping or without it.
This can be reached in three ways:
- **A parameter inside `srcdoc`.** With a message such as `<iframe srcdoc="{content}"></iframe>`, `escapeParameter` escapes `content` into character references, and the browser decodes them again.
- **Markup in a message.** A message that contains an `<iframe srcdoc="...">` keeps it after sanitizing. The documentation asks not to use HTML messages with content from users, but it also says that the sanitizer neutralizes event handlers in the final HTML.
- **Together with GHSA-8rc2-428q-7ww3.** When a call passes a list and named values, the named values are not escaped. An `<iframe srcdoc="...">` in a named value then reaches the sanitizer as markup, even with an ordinary message such as `{0} {name}`.
### PoC
```js
import { createI18n } from 'vue-i18n'
const i18n = createI18n({
legacy: false,
locale: 'en',
escapeParameter: true,
messages: {
en: { message: '<iframe srcdoc="<b>x</b>"></iframe>' }
}
})
console.log(i18n.global.t('message'))
// v11.4.13: <iframe srcdoc="<b>x</b>"></iframe>
```
The browser decodes the value and renders `<b>x</b>` as a separate document inside the `<iframe>`, in the same origin as the page. Any markup in that position is parsed the same way.
### Impact
Applications are affected when they enable `escapeParameter`, render translations as HTML (for example with `v-html`), and one of the following applies:
- an untrusted value is passed as a parameter that the message places inside `srcdoc`,
- message content is not fully trusted (for example crowdsourced or stored translations), or
- untrusted named values are passed in the same call as a list (GHSA-8rc2-428q-7ww3).
An attacker can then run script in the origin of the application (DOM-based XSS), despite the sanitizer.
Rendering through `<i18n-t>` is not affected, since it does not render translations as HTML.
### Patches
Fixed in 11.4.14 and 12.0.0-alpha.5. The sanitizer now neutralizes the `srcdoc` attribute itself, in the same way as event handler attributes.
v9 and v10 are no longer supported and will not be fixed. Please migrate to v11.
### Workarounds
- Do not render translations that can contain untrusted content with `v-html`. Use component interpolation (`<i18n-t>`) instead.
- Do not put `srcdoc` in translation messages, and do not pass values into it.
### References
- [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html), [CWE-116](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html)
- [GHSA-x8qp-wqqm-57ph](https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/security/advisories/GHSA-x8qp-wqqm-57ph) (CVE-2025-53892): the fix that added `sanitizeTranslatedHtml()`
- [GHSA-8rc2-428q-7ww3](https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/security/advisories/GHSA-8rc2-428q-7ww3): named values are not escaped when a list is also passed
- [HTML Standard: the `srcdoc` attribute](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#attr-iframe-srcdoc)
Check your whole app
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References
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/security/advisories/GHSA-83rm-6c8r-g728
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/pull/2679
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/commit/43391d20e7c85403cb59bdb21b5d542819f54042
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/releases/tag/v11.4.14
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/releases/tag/v12.0.0-alpha.5
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-83rm-6c8r-g728
- github.com/intlify/vue-i18n
Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 29 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON