Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`
CVE-2026-32633 · GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m · PYSEC-2026-343 · published 16 Mar 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: critical, CVSS score 9.1 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-32633?
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Who is affected
Glances(PyPI) <= 4.5.2-dev01
How to check
- Run
pip show Glancesin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
- Or run
npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000in your project folder. It reads your lockfile and flags this vulnerability along with every other known one.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex: it checks your lockfiles for this and upgrades it.
- Upgrade
Glancesto 4.5.2 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
## Summary
In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret.
If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance.
## Details
The Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list:
```python
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805
def _api_servers_list(self):
self.__update_servers_list()
return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else [])
```
The main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all:
```python
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480
if self.args.password:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix)
```
The Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default:
```python
# glances/main.py:425-427
parser.add_argument(
'--bind',
default='0.0.0.0',
dest='bind_address',
)
```
During Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field:
```python
# glances/servers_list.py:141-148
def __update_stats(self, server):
server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server)
...
if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc':
self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server)
elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag:
self.__update_stats_rest(f"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}", server)
```
For protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI:
```python
# glances/servers_list.py:119-130
def get_uri(self, server):
if server['password'] != "":
if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED':
clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name'])
if clear_password is not None:
server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)
uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format(
server['username'],
server['password'],
server['name'],
server['port'],
)
else:
uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port'])
return uri
```
Password lookup falls back to a global default:
```python
# glances/password_list.py:55-58
try:
return self._password_dict[host]
except (KeyError, TypeError):
return self._password_dict['default']
```
The sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse:
```ini
# conf/glances.conf:656-663
[passwords]
# localhost=abc
# default=defaultpassword
```
The secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication:
```python
# glances/password.py:72-74,94
# For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True):
# 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit
password = password_hash
```
```python
# glances/client.py:56-57
if args.password != "":
self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}'
```
The Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it:
```javascript
// glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103
fetch("api/4/serverslist", { method: "GET" })
...
window.location.href = server.uri;
```
So once `server.uri` contains credentials, those credentials are not just used internally; they are exposed to API consumers and frontend JavaScript.
## PoC
### Step 1: Verified local live proof that server objects contain credential-bearing URIs
The following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` update logic against a live local HTTP server that always returns `401`. This forces Glances to mark the downstream server as `PROTECTED` and then retry with the saved/default password. After the second refresh, the in-memory server list contains a `uri` field with embedded credentials.
```bash
cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo
@'
import importlib.util
import json
import sys
import threading
import types
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from defusedxml import xmlrpc as defused_xmlrpc
pkg = types.ModuleType('glances')
pkg.__apiversion__ = '4'
sys.modules['glances'] = pkg
client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client')
class GlancesClientTransport(defused_xmlrpc.xmlrpc_client.Transport):
def set_timeout(self, timeout):
self.timeout = timeout
client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport
sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod
globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals')
globals_mod.json_loads = json.loads
sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod
logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger')
logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace(
debug=lambda *a, **k: None,
warning=lambda *a, **k: None,
info=lambda *a, **k: None,
error=lambda *a, **k: None,
)
sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod
password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list')
class GlancesPasswordList: pass
password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList
sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod
dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic')
class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer:…
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References
- github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m
- github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/879ef8688ffa1630839549751d3c7ef9961d361e
- github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32633
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/glances/PYSEC-2026-343.yaml
- pypi.org/project/glances
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m
- github.com/nicolargo/glances
Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 28 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON