critical · 10 Patched

kobako Sandbox Escape: guest eval reaches host RCE via method_missing → public_send (any bound Service)

CVE-2026-55107 · GHSA-7pwq-q9jf-539h · published 18 Aug 2026

How serious is it

  • Severity: critical, CVSS score 10 out of 10.
  • No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
  • Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
  • No public exploit in Exploit-DB.

Is your app affected by CVE-2026-55107?

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Who is affected

  • kobako (RubyGems) >= 0.1.0, <= 0.9.0

How to check

  1. Run bundle info kobako in your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages.
  2. Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.

How to fix

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  1. Upgrade kobako to 0.9.1 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy.
  2. If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.

The advisory

### Summary A guest mruby script running inside the Kobako sandbox can execute arbitrary Ruby in the host process, fully escaping the sandbox. ### Details A host embeds bound "Service" objects that guest scripts call across the wasm boundary through the transport dispatcher. The dispatcher passed the guest-supplied method name straight to `Object#public_send` on the bound object, with no restriction to the object's own methods: ```ruby target.public_send(method.to_sym, *args, **kwargs, &block) ``` `public_send` can invoke any public method, including Ruby's ambient reflection surface. A guest pivots through the public `send` into otherwise private Kernel methods: a dispatch request with `method = "send"` and `args = [:eval, "<ruby>"]` evaluates to `target.send(:eval, "<ruby>")`, running attacker-controlled Ruby in the host. Any bound Service object is sufficient — no Service-specific behavior is required. ### Proof of Concept A guest call equivalent to: ``` Service.send(:eval, "<arbitrary host ruby>") ``` executes in the host process and can read or modify host state, spawn processes, and so on. ### Impact Complete sandbox escape leading to remote code execution in the host process, defeating the gem's central guarantee of isolating untrusted mruby scripts. Any deployment that runs untrusted or attacker-influenced scripts is affected. All released versions (0.1.0 through 0.9.0) are vulnerable; the dispatcher carried the same unguarded `public_send` sink under three successive names (`registry` → `rpc` → `transport`). ### Patches Fixed in 0.9.1. The dispatcher now rejects any method whose resolved owner is a core/meta module (`BasicObject`, `Kernel`, `Object`, `Module`, `Class`), so only methods the bound object itself defines — or dynamically handles via `method_missing` — remain reachable. The ambient reflection methods (`send`, `__send__`, `public_send`, `instance_eval`, `instance_exec`, `method`, `instance_variable_get`, …) are all owned by those modules and are blocked. ### Workarounds None within the affected versions. Until you can upgrade, do not bind any host Service object into a sandbox that runs untrusted scripts. Upgrade to 0.9.1. ### References - GHSA-7pwq-q9jf-539h - Fix commit: 64f8470 ### Credits Reported and fixed by Ahmed Al Hafoudh.

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References

Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 27 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON