In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek rpcrdma_is_bcall() …
CVE-2026-72466 · published 15 Aug 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: critical, CVSS score 9.8 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-72466?
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Who is affected
- Linux Linux: 4.14
How to check
- Find out whether you run the affected product and which version, then compare it with the versions above.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex that asks it to check whether you run this product.
- Apply the vendor's update or mitigation from the references below. If there is none yet, limit exposure of the affected service until there is.
- If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek
rpcrdma_is_bcall() decodes a reply's first words to decide whether
the frame is a backchannel call. Two issues in that decode path
let a short or malformed reply leak the receive buffer and drain
the Receive queue.
First, the speculative peek
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 0);
/* five p++ reads follow */
asks xdr_inline_decode() for zero bytes, which returns xdr->p
without consulting xdr->end. The five subsequent __be32 reads can
then walk up to 20 bytes past the wire payload into stale regbuf
contents and misclassify the reply as a backchannel call.
Second, after the post-peek
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 3 * sizeof(*p));
if (unlikely(!p))
return true;
the short-header arm returns true without calling
rpcrdma_bc_receive_call(). The contract with the caller is that a
true return transfers ownership of rep to the backchannel path:
rpcrdma_reply_handler()
if (rpcrdma_is_bcall(r_xprt, rep))
return; /* bare return, skips out_post */
...
out_post:
rpcrdma_post_recvs(r_xprt, credits + ...);
Because rpcrdma_bc_receive_call() never ran, no one took rep, but
rpcrdma_reply_handler still bare-returns past rpcrdma_rep_put()
and rpcrdma_post_recvs(). The rep, with its persistently
DMA-mapped receive buffer, is orphaned on rb_all_reps and freed
only at transport teardown. This completion reposts nothing, so
its slot is reclaimed only when a later forward-channel reply
reaches out_post and rpcrdma_post_recvs() allocates a fresh rep to
backfill; absent that traffic the Receive queue drains and the
peer's Sends draw RNR NAKs.
Fix by consulting xdr->end after the zero-length peek so the five
__be32 reads cannot run unless 20 bytes of wire payload remain. A
byte-precise comparison against xdr->end is required because a
non-4-aligned receive rounds the stream's word count up past the
true payload. Also return false from the short-header arm so the
reply falls through the normal out_norqst cleanup chain
(rpcrdma_rep_put() plus rpcrdma_post_recvs()).
Check your whole app
Dependencies are only half of it. Free and read-only: before you push, run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder, no account needed. For your live app, you prove it's yours with a one-line tag first.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/07aa506436be7634e381e1e1f6d0efa9efc81ecc
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cee8f9c3b14bd6dee9c4310090a7f45b89b834f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/118a16a18c59f7ad8084b2d13988839b669fca10
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7afc2f8d2fd9394724df9eaf22ce7a71029a5fba
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b5346284a184a6b7d019912232a571d672d3e3
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7653d5cebc8492c77ec0415b5e9c0fb3e644bc6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a2870dde3bb09d51d6b9c877642996ad6b92dd
Merged from NVD. Last updated 23 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON