ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
CVE-2026-90321 · published 17 Sept 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 7.8 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-90321?
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Cursor or any AI coding tool: it runs a free Shippable scan of your project and fixes what it finds. Built with Lovable, Bolt or v0? Scan your live app. Or upload your package file.
Who is affected
- Linux Linux: cf1d6c763fbcb115263114302485ad17e7933d87 to < 7dec19f6bafe4e1503007141c9f5eb7eb10e5578, cf1d6c763fbcb115263114302485ad17e7933d87 to < 8138d06e7a1d9a0b0481dc015c67b34e8bb60a58, cf1d6c763fbcb115263114302485ad17e7933d87 to < 3fd45b24879fa4885b66a582a6e47eda67f11310, cf1d6c763fbcb115263114302485ad17e7933d87 to < 8914a3330b72378136c2c02d6328a826f6abdad7
- Linux Linux: 2.6.28
How to check
- Find out whether you run the affected product and which version, then compare it with the versions above.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex that asks it to check whether you run this product.
- Apply the vendor's update or mitigation from the references below. If there is none yet, limit exposure of the affected service until there is.
- If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7.
This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.
This patch (of 2):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.
Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs. Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.
Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
__vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
vfs_getxattr+0x185/0x1b0
Check your whole app
Dependencies are only half of it. Free and read-only: before you push, run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder, no account needed. For your live app, you prove it's yours with a one-line tag first.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dec19f6bafe4e1503007141c9f5eb7eb10e5578
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8138d06e7a1d9a0b0481dc015c67b34e8bb60a58
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fd45b24879fa4885b66a582a6e47eda67f11310
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8914a3330b72378136c2c02d6328a826f6abdad7
Merged from CVE List. Last updated 26 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON