In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_…
CVE-2026-98988 · GHSA-6v5x-qw46-2jph · EUVD-2026-108782 · published 23 Oct 2026
How serious is it
- Severity: high, CVSS score 8.8 out of 10.
- No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
- Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
- No public exploit in Exploit-DB.
Is your app affected by CVE-2026-98988?
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Cursor or any AI coding tool: it runs a free Shippable scan of your project and fixes what it finds. Built with Lovable, Bolt or v0? Scan your live app. Or upload your package file.
Who is affected
- Linux Linux: patch: 0
- Linux Linux: patch: 7.2.11
- Linux Linux: patch: 7.3
- Linux Linux: 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b <b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10
- Linux Linux: 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b <0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a
- Linux Linux: 7.0
How to check
- Find out whether you run the affected product and which version, then compare it with the versions above.
How to fix
Copies a prompt for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex that asks it to check whether you run this product.
- Apply the vendor's update or mitigation from the references below. If there is none yet, limit exposure of the affected service until there is.
- If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.
The advisory
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE
open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a
copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged
over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be
owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace
the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a
user namespace first.
The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without
AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left
out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when
the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it
could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in
that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare()
does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and
lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing
that was covered gets revealed.
create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content
is right there in the new mount namespace:
# mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered
# echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt
# mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered
uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER):
fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE);
setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS);
open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDONLY) -> "hidden"
Covering paths with mounts is how container runtimes mask parts of
/proc and /sys and how admins hide things.
When the caller's user namespace doesn't own the source mount namespace
copy the way unshare() does and refuse a non-recursive copy of a mount
that has anything mounted below the requested directory and copy
unbindable mounts in a recursive copy. A caller that is privileged over
the source mount namespace sees no change.
Check your whole app
Dependencies are only half of it. Free and read-only: before you push, run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder, no account needed. For your live app, you prove it's yours with a one-line tag first.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98988
Merged from ENISA EUVD. Last updated 25 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON