high Patched

Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)

GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q · published 2 Oct 2026

How serious is it

  • Severity: high.
  • No exploit prediction (EPSS) score yet.
  • Not on the CISA list of exploited vulnerabilities.
  • No public exploit in Exploit-DB.

Is your app affected by GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q?

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Who is affected

  • trigger.dev (npm) < 4.5.2

How to check

  1. Run npm ls trigger.dev in your project to see the installed version, including copies pulled in by other packages.
  2. Or paste your lockfile into the checker: it lists every package with a known vulnerability, this one included.
  3. Or run npx shippable-dev scan localhost:3000 in your project folder. It reads your lockfile and flags this vulnerability along with every other known one.

How to fix

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  1. Upgrade trigger.dev to 4.5.2 or later, commit the lockfile and redeploy.
  2. If a vulnerable version was live, check your logs and rotate the secrets that server could read.

The advisory

### Summary The run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's `friendlyId`. ### Details **Vulnerable file:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` **The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:** ```typescript export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) { const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check const userId = user.id; // ... queries scoped to user's orgs } ``` **The `action` (line 166-193) — NO authentication:** ```typescript export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => { const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params); // ✗ NO requireUser() call // ✗ NO requireUserId() call // ✗ NO org membership check const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: runParam, // Queries ANY run, no org scoping }, include: { runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } }, project: { include: { organization: true } }, }, }); // ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService(); ``` The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by `friendlyId` only — no `userId` or organization filter. The `ReplayTaskRunService` then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets. **Same bug class exists in:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts` (line 17) — the `action` has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID. ### PoC **Run replay IDOR:** ```bash # Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay Cookie: <any-valid-session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/ ``` The `friendlyId` values (e.g., `run_abc123def`) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated. **Batch completion (same bug class):** ```bash # Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion Cookie: <any-valid-session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded redirectUrl=/ ``` ### Impact - **Cross-organization task execution:** An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys - **Secret exposure:** Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets - **Resource consumption:** Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks - **Data integrity:** The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues - **Low attack complexity:** `friendlyId` values are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible

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References

Merged from OSV. Last updated 25 Oct 2026. All vulnerabilities · RSS · JSON